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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Scott Maybee admits selling to Idaho consumers, without an Idaho retail 
tobacco permit, over 2.5 million cigarettes that were not listed on Idaho's Directory of Compliant 
Tobacco Product Manufacturers and Brand Families (Idaho Directory). These cigarette sales 
violate Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (Complementary 
Act), because only cigarettes that are listed on the Idaho Directory may be sold in Idaho. These 
same sales also violate Idaho's Prevention of Minors' Access to Tobacco Act (Minors' Access 
Act), because retailers may not sell tobacco products in Idaho without possessing a tobacco 
permit. 1 Maybee has nevertheless appealed the District Court's ruling that he violated both Acts, 
arguing that neither statute applies to him or his sales. Maybee argues that because he is a 
Native American located in New York, he may, with impunity, sell, collect money from, and 
ship these unlawful cigarettes to Idaho consumers in Idaho without any need to comply with the 
provisions of the Complementary and Minors' Access Acts, even though the sales are sales that 
were ordered by, paid for, shipped to, and received by Idahoans in Idaho. Maybee errs on all 
counts. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On August 21, 2006, the Attorney General wrote Maybee, advising him of Idaho's 
tobacco laws and requiring him to cease any further sales. Affidavit of Brett T. DeLange, 
Exhibit A.2 When Maybee declined to conform his business practices to Idaho law, the State 
filed a Verified Complaint against Maybee alleging violations of Idaho's Complementary and 
1 The Complementary Act is codified at Title 39, Chapter 84 of the Idaho Code. The Minors' Access Act is 
codified at Title 39, Chapter 57 of the Idaho Code. 
2 The State moved, and the Court granted, the State's motion that the Record be augmented to include this 
Affidavit. 
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Minors' Access Acts. R. pp. 7-20.3 After Maybee failed to respond, the State obtained a Default 
Judgment. R. pp. 21-23. Maybee thereafter appeared and the District Court granted his request 
to set aside the Default Judgment. R. pp. 24-25. Subsequently, after discovery was conducted, 
the State and Maybee filed cross motions for summary judgment, R, pp. 34-39. The District 
Court granted the State's motion, holding that Maybee had violated both Idaho's Complementary 
and Minors' Access Acts as a result of his cigarette sales to Idaho consumers in conceded 
contravention of both Acts. R. pp. 42-48. 
Maybee's response to the State's Complementary Act claim, in part, was to argue that he 
did not violate the Act because while his sales would be illegal in Idaho, they do not occur in 
Idaho but in New York, where he is located. In support, Maybee cited to Idaho Code Section 28-
2-401, Idaho's version of this section of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which 
establishes rules for the passage of title. Concerning the State's Minors' Access Act claim, 
Maybee argued that his status as a Native American places him beyond the reach ofldaho law. 
The District Court responded to Maybee's Complementary Act argument, in part, by 
noting that Maybee had filed sworn testimony in a New York state court case in which he 
testified "[t]hese [tobacco] sales are completed in the home state of the purchaser once their 
orders have been delivered through the mails." fd, p. 45.4 Given this testimony, the District 
Court held that Maybee was judicially estopped from arguing here in Idaho that his sales take 
3 Even after suit was filed, Maybee sold 193,000 more cigarettes during the prosecution of this lawsuit in 
violation of the Complementary and Minors' Access Acts. Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann, pp. 2-5, paras. 6-19. Ms. 
Kittelmann's affidavit is included as Exhibit 16 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
4 The quotation of Maybee is taken from paragraph 9 of an affidavit signed by Maybee in a case entitled Day 
Wholesale, Inc. v. New York, 856 N.Y.S.2d 808 (2008). This affidavit is attached to the Affidavit of Sydney 
Donahoe as Exhibit B. Ms. Donahoe's affidavit is included as Exhibit 3 to the Certificate of Exhibits. Maybee 
admitted that the affidavit attached to Ms. Donahoe's affidavit is a true and correct copy ofMaybee's affidavit in the 
Day Wholesale case. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's First Set of Discovery Requests (Maybee's Discovery 
Responses), p. 11, Response to Request for Admission No. 3. Maybee's Discovery Responses are attached to the 
Affidavit of Sydney Donahoe as Exhibit A. 
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place in New York. Id, pp. 45-46. Concerning Maybee's Minors' Access Act defense, the 
District Court ruled that Maybee was subject to that Act's permit requirements. R. pp. 46-48. 
Less than two weeks after the District Court's Order was issued, Maybee went back to 
the New York court, without notice to the State, requesting that he be allowed to "correct" his 
New York-court-filed affidavit by removing any reference to where the sales of his cigarettes 
occur. The New York court granted Maybee's request. R. pp. 70-71. Maybee then asked the 
District Court to reconsider its decision concerning Maybee's violations of the Complementary 
Act. R. pp. 67-69. The District Court denied the motion, ruling that regardless of the status of 
Maybee's "corrected" affidavit it does not mean that he is now in compliance with the 
Complementary Act's prohibition against the sale of cigarettes in violation of the Act's 
provisions and that other provisions of Idaho law make clear that Maybee, in fact, had violated 
the Complementary Act. R. pp. 70-76. Accordingly, the District Court entered Judgment 
against Maybee, R. pp. 77-79, which he appealed. R. pp. 80-85. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Maybee is a sole proprietor who sells cigarettes as a retailer from three different Internet 
websites: smartsmoker.com, ordersmokesdirect.com, and buycheapcigarettes.com. Affidavit of 
Scott Maybee, p. 2, para. 6; Maybee's Discovery Responses, pp. 6-7, Response to Interrogatory 
Number 6. 5 He promotes his cigarette business in various ways, including mailing solicitations 
directly to Idaho consumers. Affidavit of Sydney Donahoe, p. 5, para. 15, Exhibit D.6 
Idaho consumers who buy cigarettes from Maybee place their orders directly at one of 
Defendant's interactive websites. R. p. 40. Maybee states that before he ships any cigarettes, he 
5 Mr. Maybee's affidavit is included as Exhibit 6 to the Certificate of Exhibits. A true copy of Maybee's 
Discovery Responses is attached to the Affidavit of Sydney Donahoe as Exhibit A. Ms. Donahoe's affidavit is 
included as Exhibit 3 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
6 Ms. Donahoe's affidavit is included as Exhibit 3 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
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first sends a pre-shipment alert letter to the Idaho consumer's address. Further, before these 
cigarettes are delivered to Idaho consumers, Maybee requires the consumers to sign for them, 
which they do in Idaho. Affidavit of Scott B. Maybee, pp. 5-6, para. 21.7 Each of Maybee's 
various websites states that if the Idaho consumer's order is lost or damaged during shipment, the 
consumer can get a refund. Second Affidavit of Sydney Donahoe, pp. 3-4, para. 11. 8 
Maybee does not have, and has never possessed, a tobacco permit issued by the 
Department of Health and Welfare. Affidavit of Terry Pappin, p. 2, para. 2.9 Nevertheless, for 
over two years, Maybee sold and shipped 3,541,200 cigarettes to Idaho consumers. Affidavit of 
Sydney Donahoe, p. 3, paras. 5, 7. 10 Such sales violate the Minors' Access Act. 
Of the 3,541,200 total cigarettes sold, 2,552,400, which are 72.1 % of the total number of 
cigarettes sales, were of cigarette brands that were not then and are not now listed on the Idaho 
Directory. Id., pp. 3-5, paras. 9-12. 11 Such sales violate the Complementary Act. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The State requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 39-8407(5) 
of the Complementary Act in responding to this appeal. 
7 Mr. Maybee's affidavit is included as Exhibit 6 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
8 Ms. Donahoe's second affidavit is included as Exhibit 9 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
9 Ms. Pappin's affidavit is included as Exhibit 2 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
JO Ms. Donahoe's affidavit is included as Exhibit 3 to the Certificate of Exhibits. Maybee admitted the accuracy of 
these and all other cigarette sales provided the District Court by the State. Maybee's Discovery Responses, pp. I 1-
30, Responses to Requests for Admission 5-46. A true copy of Maybee's Discovery Responses are attached to the 
Affidavit of Sydney Donahoe as Exhibit A. All ofMaybee's unlawful cigarette sales are set forth in monthly reports 
prepared and submitted by Maybee to the Idaho State Tax Commission, pursuant to provisions of federal law known 
as the "Jenkins Act," codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-378. To document Maybee's illegal cigarette sales to Idahoans, 
Maybee's respective Jenkins Act reports were put on a CD Rom, labeled "Jenkins Act reports," in pdf format, 
arranged chronologically and attached to the Affidavit of Sydney Donahoe. 
11 Ms. Donahoe's affidavit is included as Exhibit 3 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review on 
appeal is the same as the standard employed by a trial court. Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 
337, 338, 160 P.3d 1272, 1273 (2007). The standard is that summary judgment may be granted 
if "there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court exercises free review in determining whether the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment. Andersen v. Prof! Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 
745-46, 118 P.3d 75, 77-78 (2005). 
II. THE LEGISLATURE, IN PROTECTING THE STATE'S PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
FISCAL SOUNDNESS, HAS ENACTED SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATION 
REGULA TING TOBACCO SALES 
In 1999, the Legislature found that smoking presents serious public health concerns to 
Idaho and its citizens. See Idaho Code § 39-7801(a). Noting that the Surgeon General also 
determined that smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, and other serious diseases, the 
Legislature found that smoking poses serious financial concerns for Idaho. Under certain health-
care programs like Medicaid, Idaho may have a legal obligation to provide medical assistance to 
eligible persons for health conditions associated with smoking, and those persons may have a 
legal entitlement to receive such assistance. See Idaho Code§ 39-7801(a) - (b). While providing 
the programs' services, the Legislature found that the State pays millions of dollars each year to 
provide medical assistance to persons for health conditions associated with smoking. See Idaho 
Code§ 39-7801(c). The Legislature further determined that the financial burdens imposed on 
the State by smoking should be borne by tobacco companies, rather than by the State, to the 
12 
extent that such companies either determine to enter into settlement agreements with the State or 
are found culpable by the courts. See Idaho Code§ 39-780l(d). 
In November 1998, leading United States tobacco companies entered into a settlement 
agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement," (MSA) with Idaho. 12 The MSA has 
been described by the United States Supreme Court as a "landmark" public health agreement, 
Lorillard Tobacco Corp. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533 (2001), that addresses "one of the most 
troubling public health problems facing the Nation today." Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000). 
The MSA is fundamentally a public health agreement. Section III of the MSA addresses 
the public health by placing significant restrictions on the advertising and marketing of tobacco 
products by those companies signing the MSA (participating manufacturers). The restrictions 
include: 
• prohibiting the targeting of tobacco product advertising or marketing to children; 
• banning the use of cartoons to advertise tobacco products; 
• limiting tobacco brand name sponsorships; 
• prohibiting payments for the use of tobacco products in the media; 
• prohibiting tobacco brand name merchandise; 
• prohibiting the distribution of free tobacco products to children; 
• prohibiting the distribution of tobacco coupons or other credits to children; 
• restricting the licensing of tobacco brand names to third parties; and 
• prohibiting material misrepresentations regarding the health consequences of smoking, . 
The MSA has had a substantial impact on cigarette consumption in the United States, 
which, according to the federal government, has declined by more than 25 percent since the 
12 The MSA is a lengthy public document. It was reviewed and approved by the district court in State v. Philip 
Morris et al., Case No. CV OC 9703239D, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County (December 3, 1998) (Eismann, DJ.) 
See Consent Decree and Final Judgment, Sec. VII.A. The Office of the Attorney General has made the MSA 
electronically available at: http://www2.state.id.us/ag/consumer/tobacco/MSA.pdf. The Court may take judicial 
notice of the MSA. I.R.E. 20 I. 
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MSA was executed. 13 According to the Center for Disease Control, youth smoking rates have 
also dramatically declined since then, although that decline has not continued in the last few 
years. 14 In addition to its public health provisions, the MSA requires participating manufacturers 
(which now number 50) 15 to make payments to the States every year to offset a portion of the 
costs imposed on the States by smoking-related diseases. See MSA, Section IX. 
Promptly after the MSA was executed, the Legislature declared that it would be contrary 
to the policy of the State if a tobacco manufacturer could decide not to enter into such a 
settlement agreement (nonparticipating manufacturers) and thereby use the resulting cost 
advantage to derive large profits in the years before liability may arise, without ensuring that the 
State will have an eventual source of recovery from them if they are proven to have acted 
culpably. This legislative detennination was driven, in part, by the fact that many diseases 
caused by tobacco use often do not appear until many years after the affected individual begins 
smoking. See Idaho Code§ 39-7801(a) & (f). 
The Legislature thus determined that it is in the interest of the State to require that 
nonparticipating manufacturers establish a reserve fund to guarantee a source of compensation 
and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large, short-term profits and then becoming 
judgment-proof before liability may arise. See Idaho Code§ 39-7801(f). Accordingly, shortly 
after the MSA was signed, the Legislature passed the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement 
13 See http://www.ttb.gov/statistics!tob dec98.pdf and http://www.ttb.gov/statistics/2007l 2tobacco.pdf The Court 
may take judicial notice of these official government reports. l.R.E. 201; see also Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337, 
340,775 P.2d 651,654 (Ct.App. 1989) Uudicial notice may be taken ofofficial reports of the federal government). 
14 See "Cigarette Smoking Among High School Students -- United States, 1991-2007," MMWR, June 27, 2008, 
Vol. 57, No. 25, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5725a3.htm. The Court may take judicial 
notice of this official government report. I.R.E. 201; see also Trautman, 116 Idaho at 340, 775 P.2d at 654. 
15 The Idaho Directory is maintained and administered by the Attorney General, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
39-8403 of the Complementary Act. The Attorney General has made the Idaho Directory available online at 
http://www2.state.id.us/ag/consumer/tobacco/directo1y index.him. The Idaho Directory, in part, lists the various 
participating manufacturers. The Court may take judicial notice of this official government report. LR.E. 201; see 
also Trautman, 116 Idaho at 340, 775 P.2d at 654. 
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Agreement Act (Idaho MSA Act). The Idaho MSA Act requires tobacco companies to either (I) 
join the Master Settlement Agreement or (2) place into a qualified escrow fund the amounts 
required by Idaho Code Section 39-7803(b )(I) of the Act. 
Also, in 1998, to address further the serious health consequences of tobacco, the 
Legislature passed the Minors' Access Act. The Legislature determined that youth access to 
tobacco is a matter of state concern. See Idaho Code § 39-5701. Accordingly, the Legislature 
enacted the Minors' Access Act, which is designed fundamentally to reduce youth access to and 
usage of tobacco products. One way the State has implemented its goal of addressing youth 
tobacco usage and sales is Section 39-5704 of the Act. That section prohibits the sale, 
distribution, or offering of tobacco products at retail without the retailer having first obtained a 
tobacco permit from the Department of Health and Welfare. Tobacco permittees are subject to 
Department oversight and statutory regulation, including inspections and compliance checks 
regarding their duties under the Act. See Idaho Code§§ 39-5704 and 39-5710. Section 39-5709 
of the Act states that the sale or distribution of tobacco products without a permit is considered 
"an effort to subvert the state's public purpose to prevent minor's access to tobacco products." 
In 2003, the Legislature determined that violations of the Idaho MSA Act by various non-
participating manufacturers threatened not only the integrity of the MSA, but also the fiscal 
soundness of the State and public health and responded with provisions to help prevent such 
violations through adoption of the Complementary Act. See Idaho Code§ 39-8401. Relevant to 
this case, Section 39-8403 of the Act establishes the Idaho Directory and makes it unlawful for 
any person to sell, offer or possess for sale in Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer 
or brand family not included on the Idaho Directory. 
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Also in 2003, the Legislature expanded the scope of the Minors' Access Act to cover 
tobacco products sold over the Internet. See 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws. Ch. 273, p. 728. Such sales 
are defined as "delivery sales" by Section 39-5702(2) of the Act. The Legislature made clear 
that Internet tobacco retailers are to comply with all regulation of tobacco sales that exist for the 
more traditional ways in which tobacco products are sold and used, including, without limitation, 
compliance with the Complementary Act. See Idaho Code§ 39-5714 of the Minors' Access Act. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE ST ATE IS 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Below, the District Court found, and Maybee agreed, that the relevant, material facts in 
this case are not in dispute. R. p. 42. Those facts, in brief summary, are that: 
(!) Maybee has sold, collected money from, and shipped millions of cigarettes to Idaho 
consumers, over 2.5 million of which are of cigarette brands that have been and are still 
today illegal to be sold in Idaho, pursuant to the Complementary Act, because the 
cigarettes Maybee was selling were not listed on the Idaho Directory; 
(2) Idaho consumers paid, signed for, and received these cigarettes in Idaho; and 
(3) Maybee has sold, collected money from, and shipped the cigarettes at issue to Idaho 
consumers in Idaho without his obtaining the tobacco permit required by Idaho's Minors' 
Access Act. 16 
Maybee's violations of the Complementary Act are straightforward. As previously noted, the 
Act, in part, prohibits "any person" from selling, offering, or possessing for sale in Idaho 
"cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in the directory." 
Idaho Code§ 39-8403(3)(b). The undisputed fact is that over a two-year period Maybee sold 2.5 
million cigarettes to Idahoans that were never on the Idaho Directory. The District Court was 
correct in granting the State judgment concerning the Complementary Act. 
16 See Affidavit ofTeny Pappin, p. 2, para. 2; Affidavit of Sydney Donahoe, pp. 3-4, para. 10; Affidavit of Scott 
Maybee, pp. 5-6, para. 21_; Second Affidavit of Sydney Donahoe, pp. 3-4, para. 11, included, respectively, in the 
Certificate of Exhibits as Exhibits 2, 3, 6 and 9. 
16 
The State's Minors' Access Act claim is equally straightforward. Despite selling 
millions of these cigarettes at retail to Idaho consumers, Maybee has never applied for nor held a 
tobacco permit as required by Idaho Code Section 39-5704 of the Act. The District Court was 
correct in granting the State judgment on this issue as well. 
IV. MAYBEE ERRS IN ARGUING THAT IDAHO LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO 
HIM BECAUSE HE IS A NATIVE AMERICAN LOCATED IN NEW YORK 
Maybee contends that even though, without a tobacco retail permit, he sells, collects 
money from, and ships non-compliant cigarettes to consumers in Idaho, this does not mean that 
he is in violation of the Idaho laws prohibiting such sales. His argument is one of geography, a 
misunderstanding of interstate commerce, a misstatement of legislative intent, and his status as a 
Native American. Specifically, Maybee's argument is that he is located in New York and the 
Legislature only intended the Complementary and Minors' Access Acts to apply to intrastate 
commerce and, in any event, because he is a Native American, Idaho is impotent to stop his 
unlawful business practices. Maybee' s arguments are in error. 
A. The Legislature Has Stated That Internet Sellers of Cigarettes Like Maybee 
Must Obey Idaho's Tobacco Sales Laws, Such as the Complementary Act 
In 2003, the Legislature expanded the scope of the Minors' Access Act, in significant 
part, expressly to regulate tobacco product sales over the Internet. See 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws. 
Ch. 273, p. 728. Such sales are defined as "delivery sales" by Idaho Code Section 39-5702(2) of 
the Act, as amended. Maybee does not dispute, and the District Court found below, that 
Maybee's sales at issue in this case were delivery sales as defined by this Act. R. p. 72. 
Crucial to and indeed what controls this case, the Legislature made clear that persons 
who engage in delivery sales such as Maybee are to be subject to and in compliance with all 
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regulation of tobacco sales that exist for the more traditional ways in which tobacco 
products are sold. The Legislature states in relevant part that Internet cigarette sellers: 
[S]hall comply with ... laws of the state of Idaho generally applicable to sales of 
tobacco products that occur entirely within Idaho including, but not limited to, those 
laws imposing excise taxes, sales and use taxes, licensing and tax stamping requirements 
and escrow or other payment obligations. 
Idaho Code § 39-5714(2) (Supp.) (emphasis added). The Complementary Act is generally 
applicable to the sale of tobacco products and even Maybee does not disagree that it would 
prohibit his non-compliant cigarette sales were they to have occurred entirely within Idaho. In 
short, the Legislature made it crystal clear that Internet cigarette sellers like Maybee must 
comply with the Complementary Act. 
B. Maybee's Argument That the Minors' Access Act and Section 39-5714(2) of 
That Act Only Apply to Intrastate Internet Cigarette Sellers Is Wrong 
It takes Maybee 44 pages of briefing to respond to Section 39-5714(2)'s mandate. His 
response is simply to state that the Legislature intended for Section 39-5714(2) only to apply to 
intrastate Internet cigarette sales and that, since he is located in New York, the Legislature 
therefore did not intend to prohibit him from selling his non-compliant cigarettes to Idaho 
consumers. Appellant's Brief, pp. 44-46. This argument is remarkable on its face because it 
directly contradicts the Legislature's very language in Section 39-5714(2), as well as the reasons 
why the Minors' Access Act was amended to cover Internet cigarette sellers. 
Had the Legislature intended Section 39-5714(2) only to apply to intrastate Internet sales 
it could have and would have said so.· But it did not. Moreover, there would have been no 
reason for the Legislature to state, as it did in Section 39-5714(2), that such Internet sellers 
must comply with "all other laws of the state of Idaho generally applicable to sales of 
tobacco products that occur entirely within Idaho." (Emphasis added). Intrastate Internet 
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cigarette sellers are already doing their sales from within Idaho. Section 39-5714(2)'s mandate 
is irreconcilably in conflict with Maybee's proposed intrastate limitation on Internet cigarette 
sellers. Indeed, his proposed limitation would render this Section absurd and mere surplusage. 
While Maybee cites to a number of cases setting forth rules of statutory construction, he 
does not cite to the two most relevant ones, which are that (I) courts assume the Legislature 
"means what is clearly stated in the statute" and will interpret a statute "to mean what the 
Legislature intended the statute to mean .... " Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 
822, 828 P.2d 848, 851 (1992) (citations omitted); and (2) courts should not adopt a statutory 
construction that is absurd or results in surplusage. Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 856, 
893 P.2d 801, 803 (1995); Doh! v. PSF Indus., Inc., 127 Idaho 232, 237, 899 P.2d 445, 450 
(1995). These rulings reject Maybee's proposed construction here. 
Other parts of the Minors' Access Act, and its 2003 amendments, also indicate a broader 
scope than that advocated by Maybee. Maybee advises this Court that there are "more than 1800 
websites offering to sell tobacco products to Idaho consumers," citing to portions of a report 
prepared by Phillip Morris on the issue. Appellant's Brief, p. 13. The report, presented to the 
District Court below, lists over 300 websites offering to sell cigarettes. See Affidavit of 
Margaret A. Murphy, Exhibit F, IDAG 139683 - IDAG 139690. 17 Significantly, only two of 
the websites listed in the report-.67 of one percent-· are located in Idaho. Id. Thus, in 
Maybee's view, when the Legislature amended the Minors' Access Act to address Internet 
cigarette sellers, the Legislature only intended to address less than one percent of the problem. 
Maybee's effort to limit Section 39-5714 to intrastate Internet cigarette sellers would also 
require this Court to rewrite portions of the Minors' Access Act. Section 39-5702(2) of the Act 
17 
Ms. Murphy's affidavit is included as Exhibit 7 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
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defines a delivery sale, in relevant part, to mean "to distribute tobacco products to a consumer in 
a state .. . " (emphasis added). For Maybee to be correct, the Legislature would have had to say 
that a delivery sale means "to distribute tobacco products to a consumer within this state by a 
person located in this state." But it did not. It said "a state," not "within this state by a person 
located in this state." Thus, even the definition of delivery sales rejects the notion that the 
Legislature intended the Minors' Access Act and Section 39-5714(2) of the Act only to refer to 
intrastate Internet cigarette sellers. 
When the Legislature amended the Minors' Access Act to cover Internet cigarette sellers, 
it stated in its Statement of Purpose: 
With the rise of tobacco sales via the internet and other direct sales means, a hole 
in existing law has surfaced. This legislation would stop a delivery sale of tobacco 
products to any individual who is under the legal minimum purchase age in Idaho. 18 
Is it reasonable to attribute to the Legislature the intent that when it thought it was closing 
the "Internet cigarette selling hole" it did so by passing a law to cover less than one percent of 
the problem? And what "hole in existing law" was there in the Minors' Access Act, than that of 
out-of-state Internet cigarette sellers selling their cigarettes to Idaho consumers without 
complying with the provisions of the Act and other tobacco sales laws like the Complementary 
Act? Would the Legislature only want to deal with less than one percent of the problem of youth 
access to tobacco and the public health? In his 73-page brief, Maybee fails to answer these 
questions or explain why the Legislature would want to act in such an inexplicably limited way. 
In upholding New York State's ban on Internet cigarette sales against a Commerce 
Clause challenge brought by Internet cigarette sellers, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
"the State has a legitimate interest in 'reduc[ing] minors' access to cigarettes through direct sales 
18 The Statement of Purpose can be accessed at: http://www3.state.id.us/oasis/2003/H0357.htm1. 
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channels."' Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 217 (2nd Cir. 2003), 
quoting Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Spitzer, 2001 WL 636441, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001 ). That interest is not limited to New York, but applies equally to Idaho and the 
Legislature's desire here to close existing holes in its tobacco sales laws. The Supreme Court 
has stated that "the Constitution ... never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all 
subjects related to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might 
indirectly affect the commerce of the country." Huron Portland Cement Co, v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 
440, 443-44 (1960) (internal quotations marks omitted). Were the opposite true, "a very large 
area [ would] be fenced off in which the States [ would] be practically helpless to protect their 
citizens." Commonwealth v. McHugh, 93 N.E.2d 751, 765 (Mass. I 950). The Legislature acted 
clearly and responsibly in requiring Internet cigarette sellers like Maybee who sell and ship their 
products to Idaho consumers to obey Idaho's tobacco sales laws. 
There is irony in what Maybee seeks to do here. Maybee wants to enjoy all the benefits 
of doing business in the global markets of the twenty-first century, but have the Legislature, 
when it comes to Internet cigarette sellers, act to protect its citizens' health and its youth's safety 
as if it were still in the nineteenth century. Maybee's proposed reading of the Minors' Access 
Act is what is outdated and unreasonable. 
C. Maybee's Discussion of the Interplay Between Idaho's Complementary and 
MSA Acts is Off-Base: There Is Nothing in the Idaho MSA Act that 
Immunizes Maybee from His Illegal Sales Here 
Maybee argues that the interplay between Idaho's MSA and Complementary Acts 
indicates that the Legislature did not intend for the Complementary Act to regulate sales into 
Idaho by out-of-state Internet cigarette sellers like Maybee. He states, without citation, that these 
two Acts "create a 'complementary and cohesive' scheme regulating the sale of stamped 
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cigarettes in intrastate commerce." Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-23 (emphasis added). This 
statement simply ignores relevant sections of both Acts. 
As noted, the Idaho MSA Act requires tobacco product manufacturers either to join the 
MSA, or place into a qualified escrow fund the amounts required by the Idaho MSA Act. Idaho 
Code § 39-7803. Tobacco product manufacturers that opt to establish escrow accounts are 
required to place into escrow a set amount for each "unit sold."19 But contrary to Maybee's 
statement, the Idaho MSA Act does not limit its escrow obligation only to cigarettes stamped 
and sold in intrastate commerce. The Idaho's MSA Act defines, in part, a tobacco product 
manufacturer as an entity that manufactures cigarettes "anywhere such manufacturer intends to 
be sold in the United States, including cigarettes intended to be sold in the United States through 
an importer." The definition does not limit tobacco manufacturers to those companies located 
within Idaho ( of which there is one small "roll-your-own tobacco" company in Lewiston, Idaho) 
or only to the extent that they are involved in intrastate commerce. Yet, under Maybee's view of 
the. Idaho MSA Act, the only entities needing to pay escrow would be Idaho-based tobacco 
companies selling in intrastate commerce. But such is not the case. Instead, the Act applies to 
and requires tobacco companies that have not joined the MSA, wherever located, to pay escrow 
on cigarettes that ultimately are stamped for sale in Idaho regardless of whether such stamping is 
of cigarettes sold in interstate commerce by the manufacturer, or by distributors, intermediaries, 
or retailers. 20 Indeed, Maybee' s argument would be a surprise to the various and numerous 
19 "Units sold" is defined, in relevant part by the Idaho MSA Act, as the "number of individual cigarettes sold in 
the state by the applicable tobacco product manufacturer (whether directly or through a distributor, retailer or similar 
intermediary or intermediaries) ... as measured by excise taxes collected by the state on packs ... bearing the excise 
tax stamp of the state." Idaho Code § 39-7802(j). 
20 Participating manufacturers each make one MSA payment based upon their national sales, with Idaho receiving 
an allocable share of that payment. Idaho's MSA payment is thus not limited to cigarette sales in intrastate 
commerce. See MSA, Section IX(c). The MSA is electronically available at: 
http://www2.state.id.us/ag/consumerltobaccolMSA.pdf. The Court may take judicial notice of the MSA. I.R.E. 
201. 
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foreign and out-of-state tobacco companies certified on the Idaho Directory, all of which either 
make MSA payments or deposit money into escrow for all of their interstate cigarette saies.21 
Maybee is equally wrong that the Complementary Act only applies to intrastate cigarette 
sales-i.e., sales where both buyer and seller are located in the same state. Maybee arrives at 
this conclusion based upon faulty reasoning. He argues a syllogism, namely that Idaho's 
cigarette tax stamps are not "affixed to cigarettes sold in interstate commerce," citing to IDAP A 
35.01.10.013 (Rule 13), and that the Complementary Act prohibits affixing an Idaho cigarette tax 
stamp to cigarettes not on the Idaho Directory, citing to Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3)(a) of the 
Complementary Act; therefore the Act must be limited to intrastate commerce. See Appellant's 
Brief, p. 25. For a number of reasons, Maybee's assertion is not sustainable. 
As a threshold matter, Maybee's syllogism is defective. Regardless of what cigarettes 
Idaho law taxes and does not tax, it does not follow that the Complementary Act is likewise 
limited. There is nothing in the Complementary Act (or Idaho's tax laws) that so provide. The 
premises Maybee relied upon for his syllogism are also faulty. For example, Maybee's assertion 
that cigarettes sold in interstate commerce are not required to have Idaho cigarette tax stamps 
affixed is wrong. Idaho law clearly requires that cigarettes, whether or not they have come to 
Idaho through interstate commerce, are taxable and must have a tax stamp affixed. The 
requirement to affix stamps is found in Idaho Code Section 63-2508, which provides in pertinent 
part: 
No cigarettes may be purchased, sold distributed, stored or held on hand or in 
possession of any person without Idaho stamps having been affixed thereto, with a 
reasonable time after receipt thereof. 
21 The number of of-state tobacco companies that are on the Idaho Directory is myriad. For example, Japan 
Tobacco Inc. is in Japan, see http://www.jti.co.jp/JTI E/outline/gaiyou.html. while Phillip Morris is in Virginia. 
See http://www.pmusa.com/en/cms/Company/Corporate Structure/Offices Facilities/default.aspx?src=top nav. 
The Court may take judicial notice of the Idaho Directory. l.R.E. 20 I; Trautman, I 16 Idaho at 340, 775 P.2d at 654. 
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No person may import cigarettes, nor hold or have in possession unstamped 
cigarettes, unless he shall have qualified under this act as a wholesaler and obtained a 
permit, as provided for in section 63-2503, Idaho Code. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the statute clearly requires that stamps be affixed and tax paid on cigarettes that are 
imported into Idaho. It should go without saying that cigarettes imported into Idaho are 
cigarettes in interstate commerce. The Legislature clearly understands and indeed intends for 
this to be the case. Indeed, that is why Idaho Code Section 63-2517 expressly states that a 
district court "shall have personal jurisdiction" over nonresident persons who are deficient in the 
cigarette tax obligations. If the Legislature intended only for cigarettes in intrastate commerce to 
be taxed, it would not have worded Section 63-2508 as it has nor provided for Section 63-2517. 
Maybee's argument for the intrastate taxation of Idaho cigarettes rests on Rule 13. This 
reliance is misplaced. Rule 13 does not exempt cigarette sales in interstate commerce from 
taxation.22 The purpose of Rule 13, in conjunction with Idaho Code Section 63-2505, is to 
provide necessary and limited authority to transport unstamped cigarettes before there is an 
opportunity to affix stamps. Indeed, all Rule 13 does is state what interstate commerce means in 
the context of applying Idaho Code Section 63-2505. That statute provides, in relevant part, that 
it is illegal to transport or receive cigarettes into or export from Idaho unstamped cigarettes, with 
three exceptions, one of which, set forth in subsection 2, is relevant here: 
Any wholesaler engaged in interstate business, who shall furnish surety bond in a sum 
satisfactory to the state tax commission, shall be permitted to set aside such part of his 
stock as may be necessary for the conduct of such interstate business without affixing the 
stamps required by this chapter. Every wholesaler, at the time of shipping or delivering 
cigarettes, shall make a duplicate invoice, showing complete details of the sale, and shall 
retain the duplicate for inspection by the state tax commission or its agent. 
22 Rule 13 states, in relevant part: 
Sales of cigarettes in the course of interstate commerce for purposes of Section 63-2505, Idaho Code, 
include only those sales where title is transferred outside the state of Idaho, or on U.S. military 
reservations, or on Indian reservations. 
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In short, what Rule 13 does, as applied to Section 63-2505, is make clear that, for example, when 
Phillip Morris or Japan Tobacco ships cigarettes to an Idaho licensed wholesaler (who has the 
legal duty to affix Idaho's cigarette tax stamp, Idaho Code§ 63-2508, and who may or may not 
be located in Idaho), it is not violating the law because those cigarettes have not yet been 
stamped. Neither Section 63-2505 nor Rule 13 support Maybee that Idaho only taxes cigarettes 
in intrastate commerce. Thus, while Maybee would have this Court believe that the State has 
written off cigarette taxes in interstate commerce, nothing could be further from the truth.23 
Maybee's other premise is equally faulty. While Section 39-8403(3)(a) of the 
Complementary Act-the section Maybee cites in support of his argument that the Act is limited 
to intrastate commerce-does prohibit stamping cigarettes not on the Idaho Directory, that is not 
the subsection under which Maybee was sued and found liable. Maybee was sued and found 
liable under Section 39-8403(3)(b), which prohibits selling and offering for sale cigarettes not on 
the Idaho Directory, regardless of whether those cigarettes are stamped or not. Hence, 
Maybee's reference to subsection (a) is inexplicable, and if anything, undercuts his position. 
Other problems with Maybee's reading of the Complementary Act exist. Section 39-
8404(1) of the Act states that a nonresident or foreign nonparticipating manufacturer that has not 
registered to do business in Idaho as a foreign corporation or business entity must, as a condition 
precedent to having its cigarettes on the Idaho Directory, appoint and engage the services of an 
Idaho agent for service of process for any matters against it arising out of enforcement ofidaho's 
Complementary or MSA Acts. It is nonsensical for Maybee to argue that the Legislation 
23 Maybee's citation to one paragraph from the State's 46-page brief in a different lawsuit brought by the State 
against various tobacco manufacturers, see Appellant's Brief, p. 24, is without context. In that paragraph, the State 
was trying to point out that cigarettes that fall under the interstate commerce definition of Rule 13 are not "units 
sold" under the Idaho MSA Act, because they do not yet have the tax stamp affixed. It is only later when those 
cigarettes are stamped that they become un.its sold. The statement most assuredly is not an admission in this case, as 
Maybee incorrectly states, that he can sell noncompliant cigarettes without regard to the Complementary Act. 
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intended the Complementary Act only to apply to intrastate sales when it adopted provisions 
requiring out-of-state tobacco companies to engage the services of an Idaho agent. If the 
Complementary Act were meant to apply only to intrastate cigarette sales, there would have been 
no reason for the Legislature to adopt Section 39-8404(1). 
No less incorrectly, Maybee argues that because the Idaho MSA Act's escrow 
requirement only applies to cigarettes stamped with an Idaho cigarette tax stamp, this means the 
Complementary Act is also limited to such cigarettes. Appellant's Brief, pp. 25-26. It is true 
that under the Idaho MSA Act nonparticipating manufacturers only have to deposit escrow for 
those cigarettes for which an Idaho cigarette tax stamp has been affixed. But it does not follow 
that this means the Complementary Act only addresses such cigarettes. The fact is that, as noted 
by the District Court below, R. pp. 74-75, the Complementary Act covers more than just "units 
sold." Indeed, it prohibits the sale of all non-compliant cigarettes, a term that incorporates both 
stamped cigarettes (units sold) and unstamped cigarettes. See Idaho Code § 39-8403(3).24 For 
Maybee's statement to be true, this Court would have to judicially replace the word "cigarettes" 
in Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act with the term "units sold," 
something, of course, that would be error to do. 
In summary, Maybee's representation that Idaho's MSA and Complementary Acts apply 
only to stamped cigarettes in intrastate commerce is nothing more than a misrepresentation of 
what both of these Acts do and the Legislature's intent in passing them. Both Acts apply more 
24 
Idaho Code Section 39-8402(2) of the Complementary Act states that the tenn cigarette has the same meaning 
as that term is defined in Section 39-7802(d) of the Idaho MSA Act. In essence, a cigarette is defined as any 
product that contains nicotine, is intended to be burned or heated under ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or 
contains (I) any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or in any substance not containing tobacco; or (2) tobacco, in any 
fonn, that is functional in the product, which, because of its appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its 
packaging and labeling, is likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette. A cigarette is also 
defined to be .09 ounces of 'roll-your-own' tobacco i.e., any tobacco which, because of its appearance, type, 
packaging, or labeling is suitable for use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as tobacco for 
making cigarettes. Significantly, at no point is cigarette defined in relation to whether it is stamped. 
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broadly than Maybee would have the Court believe and do not support his arguments on appeal. 
D. Maybee Errs in Arguing That He Does Not Offer Cigarettes for Sale in Idaho 
Finished with his attempts to limit the Complementary and Minors' Access Acts to 
intrastate cigarette sales, Maybee next seeks to convince the Court, in the alternative, that he 
simply has not violated the Acts. First, Maybee argues that he does not offer cigarettes for sale 
in Idaho. He does not dispute that he mails solicitations directly to Idaho consumers, offering 
various cigarettes for purchase. See Affidavit of Sydney Donahoe, p. 5, para. 15, Exhibit D.25 
These solicitations tell the consumer to "Stop Paying Too Much!" and list 62 different cigarette 
brands for sale, ranging from various non-compliant cigarettes like the Seneca brand, going for 
$12.99 a carton, to various compliant brands like the Marlboro brand going for $32.99 a carton. 
The mailings tell consumers they can save ten dollars if they call now and provide a toll free 
number to call to order the cigarettes. 
Maybee argues that the mailings do not mean he has "offered" cigarettes for sale in 
Idaho, even though the recipients of the mailings are all consumers residing in Idaho, because 
these mailings are merely "advertisements" and not offers for sale, and therefore are beyond the 
reach of the Complementary Act. Appellant's Brief, p. 28. Maybee's decision to label what he 
has done something different than what the Legislature has prohibited does not mean he can 
escape liability. It simply defies credibility for Maybee to say that he did not offer his cigarettes 
for sale to Idaho consumers in Idaho when he sent the mailings he has sent. The fact is any 
Idaho consumer who called Maybee pursuant to one of his mail offerings could and did purchase 
any of the cigarettes he had listed for sale at the price offered in the mailing. Under a plain 
reading of the Act, Maybee's mail solicitations sent to Idaho consumers offering non-compliant 
25 Ms. Donahoe's affidavit is included as Exhibit 3 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
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cigarettes for sale is exactly what the Legislature sought to prohibit in the Complementary Act. 
Maybee's singular argument for why his mailing cannot be construed as an offering for 
sale is that federal law "pre-empts any state law or regulation that restricts the advertising of any 
cigarettes, the package of which is labeled in conformity with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act [FCLAA]." Appellant's Brief, p. 28. This argument was never raised below 
and should not be given consideration now for the first time on appeal. Cristo Viene Pentecostal 
Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 310, 160 P.3d 743, 749 (2007).26 
E. Maybee Errs in Arguing That He Does Not Sell Cigarettes in Idaho 
The Complementary Act also prohibits, in part, "any person" from selling in Idaho 
"cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in the directory." 
Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(b). Even though Maybee sells, collects money from, and ships non-
compliant cigarettes to consumers in Idaho, Maybee argues this does not mean that he is in 
violation of the Complementary Act's prohibition against such sales. He gets to this point by 
arguing that Idaho Code Section 28-2-401, Idaho's version of this section of the UCC, indicates 
that title to the cigarettes he sells to Idaho consumers transfers in New York. This, he argues, 
immunizes him from the scope and reach of the Complementary Act. Appellant's Brief, pp. 30-
35. Maybee lacks any legal basis for applying the UCC to the Complementary Act. 
First, where and when title transfers with respect to the sale of Maybee's cigarettes is 
irrelevant to determining whether Maybee has violated the Complementary Act. Assuming for 
26 In any event, it is seriously misplaced. The FCLAA narrowly preempts state regulation of tobacco advertising 
only if it interferes with the uniform federal health warnings on cigarette packages and in advertisements. 15 U.S.C. 
§ J334(b); see Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. 504 (1991). Simply put, Congress intended the FCLAA to preempt 
state cigarette advertising regulations "motivated by concerns about smoking and health." Lorillard Tobacco Co., 
533 U.S. at 548 (emphasis added). Thus, the analysis is whether the duty imposed by the law at issue is based on 
smoking and health, not whether the subject matter of the allegations is related to "smoking and health." Here the 
duty not to offer non-complaint cigarettes for sale is not a duty based on smoking or health, but rather a duty not to 
advertise products not in compliance with Idaho law. This is clear given that there is no prohibition against offering 
compliant cigarettes for sale. As such, application of Idaho's Complementary Act is not preempted here. 
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the sake of argument that title does transfer in New York, this does not mean, under the 
undisputed facts of this case, that the Complementary Act has not been violated. The undisputed 
facts are that Idaho consumers, in Idaho, ordered the cigarettes at issue from Maybee. Idaho 
consumers, in Idaho, paid Maybee for these cigarettes. And Idaho consumers signed for and 
received these cigarettes in Idaho. This is enough to establish that Maybee sold cigarettes in 
Idaho for purposes of applying the Complementary Act. Because these cigarettes were not on 
the Idaho Directory, Maybee has therefore violated the Complementary Act. 
There is no support for the proposition that the determination of when or where title 
passes dictates whether a separate, substantive, regulatory statute has been violated. Indeed, the 
comments to the UCC expressly state that when or where title to a product transfers does not 
answer or address application of a public regulation such as the Complementary Act. Idaho 
Code Section 28-2-401 is clear: it only applies when "matters concerning title become material." 
Section one of the Official Comments to Section 28-2-40 l further clarifies this point, 
stating in relevant part: 
This section, however, in no way intends to indicate which line of interpretation should 
be followed in cases where the applicability of 'public' regulation depends upon a 'sale' 
or upon location of 'title' without further definition. 
The Complementary Act's provisions relating to the sale of cigarettes is precisely the sort of 
"'public' regulation" the UCC, according to its comments, was expressly intended not to address 
or regulate. Furthermore, it is also clear by looking at Section 28-2-401 's placement in the Idaho 
Code that it does not apply to regulatory questions. It is part of the UCC's Sales Article that 
deals with passage of title for purposes of determining the rights of the seller's creditors and a 
good faith purchaser's rights to the goods. See Idaho Code §§ 28-2-402 and -403. Of course, 
neither creditors' rights nor purchasers' protection from creditors are at issue here. 
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Nothing in the Complementary Act indicates that the provisions of the UCC are to govern 
its application. This point is relevant and serves to distinguish California State Electronics Ass'n 
v. Zeos Internat, Ltd., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1270 (1996), a case prominently relied upon by Maybee.27 
In Zeos, an in-state trade association sued an out-of-state computer manufacturer to 
enforce compliance with a California warranty law requiring manufacturers of goods sold in 
California that have express warranties to provide for local repair facilities to satisfy those 
warranty obligations. The California court ruled that the California warranty law was not 
applicable to the manufacturer because its mail order sales were not made in California. The 
court so concluded by relying upon California's version of Idaho Code Section 28-2-401. 
What distinguishes Zeos from this case is that the California warranty law relied upon by 
the trade association in that case states that California's UCC title transfer rules are to control 
how the warranty law is to be applied. 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1275-76. Thus, it was the California 
Legislature that declared that its version of Idaho Code Section 28-2-401 is to govern 
application of its warranty law. That simply is not the case here. There is no statement in the 
Complementary Act indicating that Section 28-2-401 (or any other corresponding UCC 
provision) is to govern its applicability. In fact, Idaho Code Section 39-5714(2) of the Minors' 
Access Act, as mentioned above, indicates a contrary legislative intent. In short, Zeos is simply 
of zero precedent to Maybee. The other cases he relies on are equally of no help. 
In S.K.I. Beer Corp. v. Baltika Brewers, 443 F. Supp. 2d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), a beer 
wholesaler sued a Russian brewery, claiming that its cancellation of a sales agreement without 
notice violated New York State's beer wholesaler law. The law in question, N.Y. Al. Bev. Con. 
Law § 55-c, governs transactions between beer brewers and wholesalers and states, in part, that 
27 Maybee also cites to Carlson v. Monaco Coach Com .. 486 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (E.D. Cal. 2007), but this case 
simply raised the same issue confronted by the Zeos court. Indeed, the Carlson court cites to Zeos and employs the 
same analysis utilized by Zeos in reaching its conclusions. Carlson, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1129-30. 
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agreements between breweries and beer wholesalers can only be terminated for "good cause." In 
the case, Baltika Brewers made beer for S.K.l Beer Corp. (S.K.l.), at its Russian factory, where 
S.K.I. picked it up. At some point, Baltika stopped servicing S.K.I. and S.K.l. sued, claiming 
that Baltika's termination of the agreement violated Section 55-c. The court disagreed, stating 
that the New York Legislature intended Section 55-c to regulate the sale and delivery of beer 
only in New York State. 443 F. Supp. 2d at 320. The Court went on to note that the parties' 
contract also expressly provided that the brewer "hand[] over" the beer to S.K.l at its place of 
business in Russia. Id at 322. Given these facts and the New York Legislature's intent, the 
court concluded that Section 55-c did not apply to Baltika's failure to continue to manufacture 
beer in Russia and make it available for pick up there by S.K.I. 
S.K.I. Beer Corp. is not relevant. Unlike the defendant in that case, Maybee does not 
require Idaho consumers to come to New York to pick up their cigarette orders. Unlike the 
contract between Baltika and S.K.l. in which the parties expressly agreed that the risk ofloss for 
the beer passed when S.K.I. picked the beer up in Russia, here Maybee's websites, collectively, 
state that if the consumer's order is lost or damaged during shipment, the consumer can get a 
refund. Second Affidavit of Sydney Donahoe, pp. 3-4, para. 11.28 Finally, and most 
importantly, whereas the New York Legislature intended its law to apply only to beer sales and 
deliveries in New York, the Legislature here .has made its intent clear that Internet cigarette 
sellers, including out-of-state sellers like Maybee, must comply with Idaho's tobacco sales laws 
such as the Complementary Act when they sell and ship cigarettes to Idaho consumers. 
Maybee cites to three tax cases for the proposition that courts have resorted to the U.C.C. 
28 Ms. Donahoe's second affidavit is included as Exhibit 9 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
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in determining tax liabilities.29 The Circuit City case highlights why these cases are not helpful 
here. In that case, Circuit City sold items in Massachusetts but did not collect Massachusetts 
sales tax because it allowed consumers to then travel to New Hampshire (which does not have a 
sales tax), to pick up the purchased item. Under Massachusetts law, a taxable sale occurs when 
title is transferred. The Massachusetts court referred to the U.C.C. to determine that title passed 
in Massachusetts and thus the sale was taxable under Massachusetts law, even though the items 
were later picked up in New Hampshire. 790 N.E.2d at 636-40. Circuit City is an example of a 
case where '"matters concerning title become material."' Id. at 640, quoting U.C.C. Section 2-
40 I (2). Obviously, in instances where a tax is assessed at the point in time when title transfers, 
resort to the U.C.C. as to when title does pass makes sense. But this does not mean that when the 
Legislature has declared that Internet cigarette sellers like Maybee must obey Idaho's tobacco 
laws, he can avoid doing so by relying upon the U.C.C. for when title to his cigarettes transfers. 
F. Maybee's Objection to the District Court Judicially Estopping Him from 
Asserting Here That His Sales Occur in New York Is Not Well Taken 
As noted, in rejecting Maybee's argument concerning the U.C.C., the District Court, in 
part, relied upon the fact that in litigation in New York Maybee filed an affidavit in which he 
testified that his retail sales take place in the states to which the cigarettes are shipped. R. p. 45. 
As a result, the Court held that Maybee was judicially estopped from arguing here that his sales 
take place in New York. Id., pp. 45-46.30 
Maybee argues that because he went back to the New York court and was granted 
permission to "correct" his affidavit by removing any reference to where the sales of his 
cigarettes occur, he cannot be judicially estopped from asserting that his sales take place outside 
29 The cases are Franklin Fibre-Lamitex Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 505 A.2d 1296 (Del. Sup. 1985); Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 790 N.E.2d 686 (Mass. 2003); and In re Valley Media, Inc., 226 Fed. Appx. 120 (3'' 
Cir. 2007). 
30 The District Court also correctly rejected Maybee's arguments on other independent grounds. R. pp. 44-45. 
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of Idaho. Appellant's Brief, pp. 35-43. The argument is of no moment. His "corrected" 
affidavit did not preclude the District Court from holding that he has violated the 
Complementary Act. 
The State has not found a case in the context of judicial estoppel in which the sworn 
statement at issue has subsequently been changed by the party who made the statement in the 
first place. Whether Maybee should still be judicially estopped in such circumstances is thus 
unclear, but it is of no moment and Maybee's raising it here is a straw man. As the District 
Court correctly noted, the fact is that Maybee's "corrected" affidavit does not mean that he is 
now in compliance with the Complementary Act's prohibition against the sale to Idaho 
consumers of non-compliant cigarettes. R. pp. 71-72. The "corrected" affidavit does not alter 
the Legislature's intent that Internet cigarette sellers like Maybee obey Idaho's tobacco laws, 
such as the Complementary Act, and that Maybee, in fact, does not comply with these laws. 
Thus, regardless of what Maybee's affidavit says today, the fact is that he has violated the 
Complementary Act because he sold to Idahoans in Idaho cigarettes not listed on the Idaho 
Directory. 
G. Maybee Errs By Suggesting that the Complementary Act Violates the 
Commerce Clause Unless it is Interpreted as Only Governing Intrastate Sales 
Maybee suggests that unless the Court interprets the Complementary Act as applying to 
intrastate sales only, it will run afoul of the Commerce Clause. Appellant's Brief, pp. 46-48. 
This is flat out wrong. While the Commerce Clause generally is invoked as authority for federal 
legislation, the so-called dormant Commerce Clause limits the states' ability to enact legislation 
that adversely affects interstate commerce. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
State legislation may violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it either (I) facially 
discriminates in favor of intrastate interests or (2) although facially neutral, has the "practical 
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effect" of directly controlling "commerce occurring wholly outside the State's borders." Healy 
v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). State regulation that is evenhanded passes 
constitutional muster even if it imposes an incidental burden on interstate commerce, unless it 
can be shown that the burden is "clearly excessive" when compared to the local benefits. 
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't ofEnvtL Quality. 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
In Freedom Holdings. Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205 (2nd Cir. 2004), several cigarette 
importers argued that New York's tobacco laws (termed "contraband statutes" by the court and 
serving the functionally equivalent purpose as the Complementary Act) violated, among other 
things, the dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 209. In reviewing New York's contraband 
statutes and rejecting the plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claim, the court declared: 
Appellants cannot and do not identify any in-state commercial interest that is favored, 
directly or indirectly, by the Contraband Statutes at the expense of out-of-state 
competitors. [The statutes] apply equally to the products of in-state and out-of-state 
manufacturers, and to products sold by and to in-state and out-of-state wholesalers, tax 
agents, and importers. Any incidental burdens on products originating out-of-state -
i.e., the so-called embargoing of the cigarettes of NPMs purchased by appellants is a 
result of their failure to comply with the Escrow and Contraband Statutes, a burden 
that is no greater for out-of-state economic interests than for in-state ones. 
Id. at 2 I 8 (internal citations and quotations omitted; emphasis added). The court thus affirmed 
the dismissal of the plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause claim. See id. at 235. 
This exact reasoning is applicable here and rejects Maybee's claim. The Complementary 
Act does not discriminate against Maybee in favor of intrastate retailers and does not impose 
additional burdens on him as an out-of-state retailer. No matter where a retailer resides, that 
individual or entity may sell and ship to Idahoans in Idaho only the cigarette brands of the 
manufacturers listed on Idaho's Directory.31 Maybee's Commerce Clause argument is meritless. 
31 Current case law concurs with Freedom Holdings, holding that tobacco statutes like the Complementary Act or 
the Idaho MSA Act do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. See e.g. Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 
339 (4 th Cir 2002); Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Beebe, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (W.D. Ark. 2006); Dos 
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H. Maybee Errs in Arguing that the Indian Commerce Clause Preempts 
Application of Idaho Law to Him 
Maybee argues at length that the "assertion of state authority over on-reservation conduct 
automatically raises the issue of federal preemption under the Indian Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution." Appellant's Brief, p. 48. Given such authority, he reasons, "state 
law has had 'no role to play' within reservation boundaries." Id., p. 49. Maybee predicates his 
preemption challenge to both the Complementary Act and the Minors' Access Act on that 
Clause. Id., pp. 48, 61. The Supreme Court, however, has made quite clear that, in contrast to 
the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 
possesses no dormant, or independently preempting, component. See e.g., Ramah Navajo 
School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845-46 (1982). 
In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), the Court explained 
why differences between the Interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses counseled against 
wholesale incorporation into the latter of principles developed under the former: 
It is also well established that the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses 
have very different applications. In particular, while the Interstate Commerce Clause is 
concerned with maintaining free trade among the States even in the absence of 
implementing federal legislation, ... the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause 
is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs .... 
The extensive case law that has developed under the Interstate Commerce Clause, 
moreover, is premised on a structural understanding of the unique role of the States in our 
constitutional system that is not readily imported to cases involving the Indian Commerce 
Clause. Most notably, as our discussion of Cotton's "multiple taxation" argument 
demonstrates, the fact that States and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the same 
territory makes it inappropriate to apply Commerce Clause doctrine developed in the 
context of commerce "among" States with mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction to 
trade "with" Indian tribes. 
Santos. S.A. v. Beebe, 418 F. Supp. 2d I 064 (W.D. Ark. 2006); and Star Scientific. Inc. v. Carter, 200 I WL 
1112673 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
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Id. at 192 ( citations omitted). In sum, the Indian Commerce Clause merely empowers Congress 
to act and has no independently preemptive function.32 
Rather than the Indian Commerce Clause, it is the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. 
VI, cl. 2, that serves to ensure the primacy of federal law. It is therefore revealing that every 
decision that Maybee cites for "preemption" under the Indian Commerce Clause actually 
involves application of the Supremacy Clause through, as a general matter, invocation of federal 
common law principles. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, pp. 49-51. It is those principles that govern 
disposition of Maybee's claim (erroneous here) that federal law forecloses the State from 
enforcing the Complementary and Minors' Access Acts against him. 
I. Maybee Is Subject to State Law to the Same Extent As Other Out-Of-State 
Vendors Since the Requirements of the Complementary and Minors' Access 
Acts Are Triggered by Off-Reservation Activity in the Form of Introducing 
Tobacco Into Idaho 
In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), the Supreme Court was asked 
to prohibit New Mexico from imposing a gross receipts tax on revenue generated from a tribal 
ski resort and a use tax on materials employed in constructing the resort's lifts. The resort was 
located just outside the tribe's reservation on land leased from the United States Forest Service. 
Id at 146. The resort's location was critical because "in the special area of state taxation, absent 
cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory 
authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within 
32 The immateriality of the Indian Commerce Clause for preemption purposes has been noted in two post-MSA 
Indian law decisions concerned with tobacco regulation. First, a federal district court denied preliminary injunctive 
relief in an Indian Commerce Clause-based challenge to New York's prohibition against direct shipments of 
cigarettes to consumers. Ward v. New York, 291 F. Supp. 2d 188 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). It reasoned in relevant part 
that "[a]lthough another provision of the Constitution, the Interstate Commerce Clause, has a dormant or negative 
aspect, the Indian Commerce Clause does not." Id. at 199. Less than six months later, a second federal district 
upheld the validity of Iowa's version of Idaho's MSA Act against Indian Commerce and Supremacy Clause 
challenges by a Nebraska Indian tribe and an "economic enterprise" incorporated under the tribe's law. Omaha 
Tribe v. Miller, 311 F. Supp. 8 I 6, 822 (S.D. Iowa 2004). With reference to the Indian Commerce Clause, the court 
stated that it "in and of itself does not provide an automatic exemption for Indian tribes." Id. at 822. 
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the boundaries of the reservation." Id at 148. "[T]ribal activities conducted outside the 
reservation present different considerations[,]" however, and in that situation "[a)bsent express 
federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been 
held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State." Id 
at 148-49. 
With that principle in mind, the Court found the gross receipts tax permissible, given the 
resort's location, but deemed the use tax preempted by virtue of a provision in the Indian 
Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465, which proscribes taxation of land taken into trust for a 
tribe or tribal member. On the latter point, it reasoned that "the lease arrangement here in 
question was sufficient to bring the Tribe's interest in the land within the immunity afforded by § 
465," 411 U.S. at 155 n.11, since the ski lifts had been permanently attached to the land and 
"[t]he jurisdictional basis for use taxes is the use of the property in the State." Id. at 158 
( emphasis supplied). The differing result with regard to the use tax thus derived from the 
combination of an explicit congressional directive satisfying the "express federal law to the 
contrary" exception to the general rule and the nature of the conduct that triggered the tax 
obligation as a matter of state law. 
The Supreme Court applied Mescalero Apache most recently in Wagnon v. Prairie Band 
Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005), where it upheld imposition of a state fuel tax on an off-
reservation distributor with respect to purchases by a tribal retailer for on-reservation sale. The 
Court rejected the proposition that the tax's validity must be assessed under the interest-balancing 
test governing on-reservation transactions prescribed in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), because "[w]e have taken an altogether different course, by 
contrast, when a State asserts its taxing authority outside of Indian Country." 546 U.S. at 112. 
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That "altogether different course" was Mescalero Apache which controlled in light of the off-
reservation "where" of the Kansas fuel tax-i.e., the fact that the tax accrued upon receipt of the 
fuel by the distributor at its off-reservation place of business. The Court reasoned, "the 'use, sale 
or delivery' that triggers tax liability is the sale or delivery of the fuel to the distributor." Id. at 
I 07 ( emphasis added). 
Mescalero Apache and Wagnon establish the fundamental framework against which 
Maybee's Indian law-based preemption claim must be measured. The requirements of the 
Complementary and Minors' Access Acts are "trigger[ed]" for present purposes by his 
introduction of tobacco into this State, not by the simple fact that an Idaho resident chooses to 
purchase cigarettes from a vendor whose physical place of business is located outside the State. 
If an Idaho resident traveled to New York to purchase and receive his cigarettes, the Acts would 
be inapplicable. The critical "where" of the transaction is thus Idaho, not Maybee's New York 
place of business. Maybee is treated no differently than other remote vendors, and the fact that 
he is located on his reservation is thus irrelevant to this case. 
In sum, Maybee's liability for violating the Complementary Act arises from selling and 
shipping to Idaho consumers cigarettes that are not on the Idaho Directory, while his violation of 
the Minors' Access Act stems from failure to obtain a tobacco permit for those retail cigarette 
sales. Neither of these violations depends upon where he does business; i.e., the "trigger[ing]" 
event for statutory coverage is the fact that he causes cigarettes to be introduced into this State. 
J. Even Were Interest-Balancing Required Because Maybee is Located on His 
Tribe's Reservation, He Did Not Challenge the Complementary Act on That 
Ground Below, and Plainly Adequate State Interests Support Application of 
the Minors' Access Act to Him 
Maybee substantially alters his position on appeal from that argued below, particularly in 
connection with the Complementary Act. Below, he argued that Moe v. Confederated Salish and 
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Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), prevented enforcement of the permit requirement in the 
Minors' Access Act. Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum (Maybee Mem.), pp. 25-
27; Defendant's Reply Summary Judgment Memorandum (Maybee Reply Mem.), pp. 21-22, and 
that the interest balancing used in various Indian law contexts dictates preemption of that law. 
Maybee Mem., pp. 29-31; Maybee Reply Mem., pp. 22-24.33 He did not address the 
Complementary Act in either argument. Instead, he contended only that the Indian trader 
statutes, 25 U.S.C. § 261-265, preempt the Complementary Act. Maybee Mem., pp. 21-24; 
Maybee Reply Mem., pp. 18-19. Here, Maybee argues that the controlling preemption standard 
is that "state laws are generally inapplicable, absent express congressional authority[,]" to on-
reservation activities of the resident tribe and its members. Appellant's Brief, p. 50. He further 
asserts that, under that standard, not only the Minors' Access Act, id, pp. 69-73, but also the 
Complementary Act, id., pp. 52-60, is preempted because the State failed to establish the 
requisite interest. His vacillating preemption theories procedurally default his preemption claim 
as to the Complementary Act and, as to the Minors' Access Act, fail to warrant preemption even 
if the triggering event for the latter's application occurred in New York State. 
1. Maybee Waived the Interest-Balancing Theory Below with Respect to the 
Complementary Act and Abandons on Appeal the Indian Trader Statutes-
Based Theory That He Did Raise 
Maybee should be held to the ordinary standard that an appellant in aii appeal from a 
summary judgment ruling may not raise new issues that depend upon facts that could, and 
should, have been raised before the lower court. See Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,404, 848 
P.2d 984, 988 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[i]n considering the correctness of an order granting partial 
summary judgment, raised on appeal after trial, our review is limited to those facts and 
33 Maybee's Memorandum and Reply Memorandum are included as part of the Certificate of Exhibits, 
respectively, as Exhibits 4 and I 0. 
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allegations before the district court at the time it ruled on the motion"). Thus, as Eliopulos 
suggests, an appellant "is barred from making ... an argument before this Court because it did 
not properly raise the issue below" in the relevant summary judgment pleadings. Turner v. Cold 
Springs Canyon Ltd. P'ship, 143 Idaho 227,229, 141 P.3d 1096, 1098 (2006). 
Below, Maybee sought refuge with respect to preemption of the Complementary Act in 
only one safe harbor-the Indian trader statutes-and made none of the essentially fact-based 
contentions concerning the lack of a sufficiently strong state interest. Now, however, Maybee 
claims that "[t]he State has failed to allege or to show that [his] on-reservation conduct has off-
reservation effects that impair a significant interest intended to be protected by the 
Complementary Act," Appellant's Brief, p. 55, by, inter alia, failing "to show how [his] conduct 
has the effect of threatening 'the integrity' of the Master Settlement Agreement with leading 
tobacco manufacturers," id., p. 56, or to establish that the financial impact from nonparticipating 
manufacturers' noncompliance with the Agreement "threatens 'the fiscal soundness of the state,"' 
id., p. 57. He adds that "[t]he State has alleged no culpable conduct on the part of any non-
participating manufacturers whose brands are not certified for sale in the State, but are sold by 
[him]," id., p. 58, and concludes with the assertion that "the State has not alleged or presented 
any evidence that Native American or other non-participating manufacturers have engaged in 
any conduct from which they could be 'found culpable by the courts."' Id. at 59. None of these 
assertions, again, was presented to the District Court in the context of making an Indian law 
challenge to application of the Complementary Act to him. 
While the Court has held that '"[ c ]onstitutional issues may be considered for the first time 
on appeal if such consideration is necessary for subsequent proceedings in the case[,]"' the 
present appeal is not such a case because, regardless of how the Complementary Act challenge is 
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resolved, no further proceedings on that challenge will be needed. State v. Fodge, 12 l Idaho 
192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Maybee cast his Jot with his reading of the Indian trader 
statutes, and the claim rises or falls with that reading. Before this Court, Maybee abandons 
reliance on those statutes as to the Complementary Act and cites them solely in connection with 
his attack on the Minors' Access Act-precisely opposite to the tack that he took before the trial 
court. Appellant's Brief, p. 66. Under these circumstances, he has forfeited any Indian law-
based challenge to the Complementary Act. 34 
2. Even Were Interest-Balancing Required Because of Maybee's Location on 
His Tribe's Reservation, the Minors' Access Act Is Not Preempted 
Maybee argued principally below that the permit requirement under the Minors' Access 
Act is preempted on the basis of the Supreme Court's invalidation of a cigarette vendor license 
fee provision in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, supra. Maybee Mem., pp. 25-
27.35 He contended that the interest-balancing test articulated in Bracker controls "whenever a 
state asserts authority over activities conducted on a reservation that has off-reservation effects" 
id, p. 29, and that, under such test, the permit requirement here is invalid. Id, pp. 29-30. 
Maybee modifies his analytical approach somewhat before this Court, raising for the first 
time the contention that Bracker establishes a "strong presumption" against state regulation of 
34 Even had Maybee chosen on appeal to pursue the Indian trader statutes-based challenge to the Complementary 
Act, the outcome here would be unaffected. The Act simply does not regulate the relationship between Maybee and 
wholesalers or tobacco manufacturers with whom he deals-since nothing in the Idaho law prevents him from 
generally ordering whatever brand of cigarettes that he desires from them-but merely limits his ability to introduce 
noncompliant cigarettes into the State. At most, therefore, the Complementary Act affects Maybee's ability to 
market non-compliant cigarettes for delivery to Idaho consumers-a relationship that has been conclusively held 
outside the preemptive ambit of the Indian trader statutes. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville 
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155-56 (1980) ("[t]he Indian traders statutes ... incorporate a congressional 
desire comprehensively to regulate businesses selling goods to reservation Indians for cash or exchange, ... but no 
similar intent is evident with respect to sales by Indians to nonmembers of the Tribe") ( citations omitted). The 
District Court thus properly, and succinctly, rejected Maybee's theory because the trader statutes "clearly regulate[] 
only sales to Indians, not sales by Indians." R., p. 46. For the same reason, his reliance on those statutes here for 
preemption of the Minors' Access Act is misplaced. 
35 Defendant's Memorandum is included as Exhibit 4 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
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tribal members with respect to commercial transactions involving nonmembers-a presumption 
which can rebutted instantly only by "show[ing) that Congress granted [the State) civil 
regulatory authority over out-of-state reservation sellers who ship tobacco products to Idaho 
consumers or that [the State) has a significant interest warranting state intervention." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 62. He then argues that no such authorization exists, id., pp. 62-67, and only then turns 
to Moe's treatment of the Montana cigarette vendor license requirement, id., pp. 67-69, and the 
purported absence of any meaningful state interest in enforcing the permit requirement against 
him. Id., pp. 69-73. His labored analysis cannot obscure the plain validity of the Idaho permit 
requirement's "minimal burden" in light of the concededly strong state interest Idaho has in its 
youth not acquiring tobacco. 
a. Moe Counsels Against, Not for, Maybee's Position 
Moe contains four holdings: (1) Montana's personal property tax could not be imposed 
on motor vehicles owned by tribal members residing on reservation; (2) Montana's cigarette tax 
could not be imposed on Indian-to-Indian reservation sales; (3) Montana's cigarette vendor 
license fee could not be charged to tribal retailers; and (4) Montana could require tribal retailers 
to collect and remit cigarette taxes imposed on non-Indians with respect to reservation sales. 
425 U.S. at 480-81, 483; see Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 §§ 84-5606.3 and -5603.5 (requiring 
cigarette vendors to acquire license from the Montana Department of Revenue, and imposing a 
five-dollar annual fee). The Supreme Court did not hold, as Maybee apparently believes, that 
simply being required to obtain a license-if no fee was attached-was preempted. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 68. Indeed, such a holding would have been incongruous given the Supreme Court's 
sustaining Montana's authority to require tribal retailers to collect and remit cigarette taxes from 
42 
nonmember purchasers, a requirement which it characterized as "a minimal burden" and "not, 
strictly speaking, a tax at all." Id. at 483. 
The "minimal burden" rationale was expanded upon in Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (I 980). There, the Supreme Court upheld 
Washington's authority to impose more robust regulatory obligations on tribal retailers with 
respect to nonmember cigarette sales-i. e., maintaining "detailed records of exempt and 
nonexempt sales in addition to simply precollecting the tax." Id. at 151.36 It reasoned that "[t]he 
simple collection burden imposed by Washington's cigarette tax on tribal smokeshops is legally 
indistinguishable from the collection burden upheld in Moe." Id. The Supreme Court has not 
retreated from its "minimal burden" holdings in Moe and Colville. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue & 
Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 76 (1994). 
Maybee's contention that Moe precludes Idaho from requiring him to obtain a permit 
pursuant to the Minors' Access Act runs headlong into the "minimal burden" attendant to that 
duty. No fee is charged for the permit, Idaho Code§ 39-5703(3); IDAPA 16.06.14.01, and that 
fact negates the relevance of Moe's vendor fee holding. 
b. Idaho's Substantial Interest in Restricting Access of Its Youth to Tobacco 
Clearly Justifies Requiring Maybee to Obtain a Permit 
The Supreme Court's decision in Bracker sheds light on the analytical approach 
appropriate for determining whether the Minors' Access to Tobacco Act's permit requirement 
passes Supremacy Clause muster if the conduct triggering application of the Act were deemed to 
occur on reservation. Bracker involved the question whether Arizona could impose motor carrier 
36 The Washington cigarette tax statute, inter a/ia, required retailers to "record the number and dollar volume of 
taxable sales to nonmembers of the Tribe" and, as to tribal members, to "record and retain for state inspection the 
names of all Indian purchasers, their tribal affiliations, the Indian reservations within which sales are made, -and the 
dollar amount and dates of sales." 447 U.S. at 159. The statute provided further that "unless the Indian purchaser is 
personally known to the operator he must present a tribal identification card." Id. 
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license and use fuel taxes on a nontribal firm with respect to on-reservation timber hauling 
undertaken pursuant to a contract with the resident tribe. In answering this question, the Court 
set out an analytical test that subsequently has been employed when a State regulates commercial 
transactions between tribes and nonmembers on reservation: 
In such cases we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in 
terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have 
developed from historical traditions of tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent 
on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a 
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an 
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state 
authority would violate federal law. 
448 U.S. at 144-45 (citing, inter alia, Moe, 425 U.S. at 480-81). As the Court's citation to Moe 
indicates, the issue is here whether the simple obligation to secure a no-fee permit embodies a 
permissible "minimal burden" and, in making that determination, the relevant federal, state and 
tribal interests must be considered. The issue, therefore, is whether the simple obligation to 
secure a no-fee permit embodies a permissible "minimal burden" when measured against 
relevant federal, state and tribal interests. 
The most detailed application of the minimal burden test in the tobacco context by a 
lower court is Ward v. New York, supra. The controversy there involved enforcement ofa New 
York statute prohibiting the direct shipment of cigarettes to consumers, with a limited exception 
not applicable here. 291 F. Supp. 2d at 194 n.3. The court there considered a facial preemption 
challenge to the statute in several scenarios, including direct shipment from an on-reservation 
tribal business to a nonmember. It declined in that context to grant a preliminary injunction and 
determined, in relevant part, that Colville and its minimal burden analysis dictated that the New 
York delivery statute law would not be enjoined. 291 F. Supp. 2d at 203-05. 
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As for the intere_st balancing test itself, the court focused on the fact that "the federal 
government has been generally supportive of state regulation of cigarette sales," Id at 204 
( emphasis added), and that New York has an interest in mitigating the '"pernicious effects of 
cigarette smoking' by reducing adult consumption and restricting minors' access to cigarettes." 
Id at 205. It further rejected the contention that "the Statute completely destroys the business of 
reservation cigarette retailers" since "[t]he Statute does not ban the sale of cigarettes" but merely 
. 
"restricts the direct shipment of cigarettes to New York consumers." Id 
The relevance of Ward's analysis here needs little elaboration. Maybee acknowledged 
below that his tobacco sales "have off-reservation effects" and that, in furtherance of Idaho's 
interest in its residents' health, the State "may exercise some regulatory authority over out-of-
state delivery sellers who ship tobacco products to [those] residents." Maybee Mem., p. 30.37 
He further recognizes that "[t]he State has a significant interest in preventing youth access to 
tobacco." Appellant's Brief, p. 70. However, rather than measuring the reach of that authority 
through an examination of the involved federal, state and tribal interests, Maybee contends, 
irrelevantly, that the permit requirement need not be applied to him because "he verifies the 
name, address and age of each Idaho consumer before he accepts an order for a delivery sale[,] .. 
. informs Idaho consumers that it is illegal to sell or give tobacco to minors" and otherwise 
complies with Jenkins Act reporting obligations. Id at 70-71. Maybee never explains how what 
he says he does exonerates himself from his obligation as a tobacco retailer to obtain an Idaho 
Minors' Access Act permit or undercuts the State's interests in requiring all tobacco retailers to 
first obtain a permit from the State. 
37 
Maybee's Memorandum is included as Exhibit 4 to the Certificate of Exhibits. 
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An analysis of the involved interests undercuts Maybee and supports the State. Federal 
law-specifically 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26-encourages states to adopt laws that prohibit sales of 
tobacco products to persons under the age of 18 by providing grants from the Department of 
Health and Human Services. Congress thus has affirmatively approved regulatory schemes like 
the Minors' Access Act. For interest balancing purposes, therefore, the federal interest militates 
strongly toward the Act's enforceability in all situations except those where Congress has spoken 
to the contrary. Maybee identifies no apposite, contrary congressional directive with respect to 
Idaho's tobacco permit requirement.38 
The State's interest in preventing minors from smoking is, as Maybee rightly concedes, 
obvious and singularly compelling. See N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Rowe, 377 F. Supp. 2d 
197, 206 (D. Me. 2005) ("Given the deadly health consequences, there are no persuasive 
arguments for allowing minors to have tobacco products. Thus, it is hard to believe that, if 
Congress were confronted now with the specific question whether Maine should be able to take 
steps to protect the health of its children, Congress would vote to prohibit what Maine is trying to 
do"), affd in part and rev'd in part, 448 F.3d 66 (1 st Cir. 2006), ajj'd, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008). The 
permit requirement of the Minors' Access Act contributes to the State's efforts at controlling the 
ability of minors to obtain tobacco by ensuring that the Department of Health and Welfare has a 
central repository of all businesses marketing tobacco to Idaho residents with a uniform set of 
38 Aside from the Indian traders statutes discussed above at pp. 36 - 38, Maybee points only to the Contraband 
Cigarettes Trafficking Act ("CCTA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346, as a federal statute immediately relevant to tobacco 
regulation. Appellant's Brief, pp. 65-67. He argues that a provision in 2006 amendments preserving a tribe's 
sovereign immunity "demonstrate[s] that Congress has not allowed states to exercise jurisdiction over tobacco sales 
conducted on Indian reservations." Id at 65. The CCTA provision cited-18 U.S.C. § 2346(b)(2)-establishes no 
such proposition. It merely disclaims any intent to abrogate federal common law based-immunity from suit 
possessed by Indian tribes. Tribal members, like Maybee, have no like immunity either generally or with respect to 
enforcement of state tobacco laws. See e.g., Oklahoma Tax Com'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of 
Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 514 (1991). Indeed, to the extent that the CCTA, a statute of general applicability, serves 
as a vehicle to enforce state tobacco law within Indian country, it can hardly be deemed as manifesting sub silentio 
Congress' intent to foreclose states from imposing the types of "minimal burdens" explicitly authorized by Moe, 
Colville and later decisions. See United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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data which facilitates compliance monitoring and, where necessary, enforcement actions. 
Indeed, the Legislature states that the retail sale or distribution of tobacco products without a 
permit is to be considered "an effort to subvert the state's public purpose to prevent minor's 
access to tobacco products." Idaho Code § 39-5709. 
Finally, to characterize the burden on Maybee of submitting annually a no-charge permit 
application for his operations as "minimal," if anything, overstates the impact; the burden is 
virtually non-existent. The permit obligation is easily discharged. Indeed, it is far less intrusive 
on Maybee's time and resources than the record-keeping and tax collection duties approved in 
Moe, Colville or those cases' later application. See, e.g., Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Rising. 
477 F.3d 881, 890-92 (6th Cir. 2007). Weighed against the federal and state interests strongly 
favoring the overall objectives of the Minors' Access Act, Maybee's objection to securing a 
permit is meritless. Interest-balancing analysis, even were it necessary, supports the permit 
. ' 1·d· 39 requirements va 1 1ty. 
V. THE ST A TE REQUESTS AN A WARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Idaho Code Section 39-8407(5) of the Complementary Act states that "[i]n any action 
brought by the attorney general to enforce this chapter [the Complementary Act], the attorney 
general shall be entitled to recover the costs of investigation, expert witness fees, costs of the 
39 Maybee cites New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983), (not to be confused with 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), discussed above), in his Complementary Act analysis for the 
notion that, since his on-reservation conduct is regulated, "significant" off-reservation effects must be proved by the 
State. Appellant's Brief, p. 54. He advances the same standard as to the Minors' Access Act. Id at 62. What could 
not be more evident from Moe and its progeny, however, is the principle that where regulation of tribal vendors is 
concerned, states may impose administrative-i. e., non-tax-burdens on such vendors to ensure furtherance of 
legitimate state interests, insofar as they are not outweighed by countervailing federal and tribal interests. In this 
case, the latter interests substantially outweighed New Mexico's. 462 U.S. at 341 ("[t]he assertion of concurrent 
jurisdiction by New Mexico not only would threaten to disrupt the federal and tribal regulatory scheme [concerning 
on-reservation hunting and fishing by nonmembers], but would also threaten Congress' overriding objective of 
encouraging tribal self-government and economic development"). Unlike the present case, where the State is 
concerned exclusively with the effects of tobacco being introduced into Idaho, New Mexico identified no "off-
reservation effects that warrant State intervention." Id. at 342. Regardless of the label assigned to the state interests 
here, they unquestionably have more "significance" than those in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache, and, in studied 
contrast with that case, are not diminished by any measurable federal or tribal interests. 
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action and reasonable attorney's fees. Thus, should this Court affirm the District Court, the State 
is entitled to and therefore requests its reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed. This Court should 
award the State reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 31 st day of October 2008. 
By: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ST A TE OF IDAHO 
~~~ 
BRETT T. DeLANGE ~ 
Deputy Attorney Gene.rat 
Consumer Protection Division 
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